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The Effects of Company Risk, Founders’ Characteristics and Corporate 




Combining the agency perspective, resource-based view and upper echelon research, this 
paper examines factors affecting the implementation of equity based incentive schemes in 
initial public offerings (IPOs). In line with agency research, the probability of equity-based 
incentives is negatively associated with the IPO firm’s riskiness. The paper shows that 
performance-related incentive schemes are negatively associated with share ownership and 
board power of the IPO’s founding directors. Large-block share ownership is positively 
associated with the probability of conditional incentive schemes. However, board 
independence and non-executive directors’ interests do not have any effects on “toughness” 
of executive compensation. The paper suggests a number of avenues for a future analysis of 






An increasing number of fast-growing firms face the decision to go public at different stages 
of their life-cycle, and the process of Initial Public Offering (IPO) has had increasing 
attention from academics (Jain & Kini, 1999; Ritter, 1987).  Predominantly research on IPO 
companies has focused on areas such as underpricing (Brennan & Franks, 1997; Certo, 
Covin, Daily & Dalton, 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Pham, Kalev & Steen, 2003), post 
issue performance (Espenlaub & Tonks, 1998; Mikkelson, Partch & Shah, 1997) and their 
relationships with general corporate governance parameters such as board structure and 
characteristics (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). Within 
these diverse research streams, a relatively little attention has been given to the role of 
executive compensation with regards to the IPO company. Although Beatty and Zajac (1994) 
argue the need for a more unified perspective on the control of executive compensation in the 
IPO company, there is little understanding among academics and practitioners of factors 
affecting introduction of executive compensation schemes at the time of IPO, as well as their 
structural characteristics, such as their relation to various performance targets established by 
the firm’s board and shareholders.  
 
Financial economists and organization theorists have developed a substantial body of 
literature on factors driving executive compensation and its organizational outcomes (see 
Filatotchev, Jackson, Gospel & Allcock, 2007, for an extensive literature review). Most of 
executive compensation studies have been rooted in labour economics and agency theory and 
have focused predominantly on mature publicly listed companies.  Over recent years this has 
provided fuel for commentators to criticize the remuneration received by top executive 
directors.  Many US studies have relied on agency theory to explain possible links between 
executive pay and the performance of the company, but these links have been found to be 
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weak or non-existent (Barkema, Geroski & Schwalbach, 1997; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; 
Main, Bruce & Buck, 1996).  Within the UK these links also have not been strong (Conyon & 
Leech, 1994; Gregg, Machin & Symanski, 1993). Greater disclosure within the UK following 
a number of corporate governance reports (Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998a, 1998b) has 
aided the study of executive pay, and research on compensation issues and the mature listed 
company has been widened to encompass areas such as compensation and option incentives 
(Conyon & Sadler, 2001), the structure of compensation contracts (Conyon, Peck, Read & 
Sadler, 2000) and governance issues such as board control and remuneration committees 
(Conyon & Peck, 1998). However, the structure and characteristics of executive share-based 
compensation in the IPO company still remains unexplored, even though it provides a unique 
opportunity to study equity based incentive pay schemes such as executive share options and 
long term incentive plans at a crucial time in the firm’s development, which is often referred 
to as a “strategic threshold” (Filatotchev, Toms & Wright, 2006).  
 
This paper extends previous work in several ways. First, it contributes to the agency research on 
executive compensation by moving away from mature and well-established organizations to 
IPOs. It suggests that the introduction of equity-related incentives depends not only on a firm’s 
risk factors, it is also associated with founders’ characteristics such as their retained share 
ownership and control over the IPO firm’s board.  Second, the paper suggests an integrated 
theoretical framework that augments traditional agency perspective by incorporate relevant 
elements of the resource-based view and behavior research, and analyzes how executive pay 
may be influenced by structural characteristics of the board and financial incentives of non-
executive directors. Third, the impact of theoretically significant contextual factors such as 
large-block shareholdings on the “toughness” of executive pay contracts is analyzed in the very 
specific environment of IPO. Finally, the theoretical framework and related hypotheses are 
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empirically tested using a sample of 311 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK during the period of 
1998-2002. We define entrepreneurial IPOs as those stock market flotations in which the 
original founders retain equity stakes and board positions.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the conceptual framework and 
research hypotheses. This is followed by a description of the data sources, variable 
definitions and research methodology. The third section presents the results. Conclusions are 
drawn in a final section. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In their seminal article on corporate governance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) indicate that the 
flotation of a company’s shares on the public market leads to the ‘principal-agent’ concern: 
how to reconcile the interests of incumbent managers and executive directors (as ‘agents’) 
with those of the company’s ultimate owners – the shareholders (as ‘principals’).  ‘Best 
practice’ guidelines within the UK, suggest that appropriate mechanisms need to be put in 
place to motivate directors to align their own interests more closely with the shareholders, 
thus ensuring goal congruence (Association of British Insurers, 2002).  Supporting these 
guidelines, incentive schemes for executive directors have been recommended as the key way 
to help overcome agency problems (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Murphy, 1985), with greater amounts of the managers’ compensation being tied 
directly to the performance of the company (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  At the point of the 
IPO this becomes particularly relevant, and, indeed, some authors argue that one of the 
reasons for a private company to go public is a possibility to introduce share-based incentive 
schemes (Pagano & Röell, 1998).  Normally, an IPO leads to a significant amount of capital 
raised with the issue of shares, but it also creates the dilution of ownership from the existing 
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founders to outside institutional and retail investors.  Thus at the point of the IPO, founders 
and executives face both an exciting growth period and an uncertain time as they place shares 
beyond their control into the open market.  Agency theory argues that governance structures 
should be put in place to re-align both parties.  The executives however, are more risk 
adverse compared to diversified shareholders, and they may be engaged in self-serving 
behavior.  This could be particularly relevant for the IPO firm with founders on the board, as 
they effectively diversify the company risk to external parties with the sale of shares.  
Furthermore, they relinquish some of their control with the dilution of share ownership. 
 
Building on the agency perspective of the IPO firm’s governance aspects (e.g., Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Pagano, Panetta & Zingales, 1998; Pagano & Röell, 1998), and research on 
behavior and power in organizations (e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Golden & Zajac, 2001; 
Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1995) this paper argues that in the IPO firm’s decisions 
to implement equity-based incentive schemes and the extent of their “toughness” are not 
exogenous factors. Rather, they are linked to corporate governance factors, as well as the 
distribution of power in the IPO. Figure 1 provides an outline of our research framework.  
 
At Stage 1, the IPO management team makes decision whether it should adopt an equity-
based incentive scheme. From agency perspective, risk-averse executives would resist this 
adoption if the IPO represents a high-risk firm. When the scheme is adopted, at Stage 2 the 
IPO makes decisions about its “toughness”, e.g., whether executive compensation should be 
performance-related, bearing in mind that IPO firms often have high growth potential but 
they usually under perform their industry peers in terms of generating a stable cash flow.  As 
Figure 1 suggests this decision depends on two sets of factors: founders’ characteristics and 
general corporate governance parameters. Agency and behavior research suggests that the 
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founders’ entrenchment, associated with their board power and retained share ownership, 
may have a negative impact on the introduction of performance-related schemes, since 
opportunistic founders may try to shift risk to outside investors. However, independent 
boards and large-block shareholders in the IPO may provide a counter-balance to founders’ 
entrenchment and support the development of performance-related incentive schemes, since 
external shareholders should have a direct interest in aligning their interests with interests of 
executive directors (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The following sections develop these arguments 
further and suggest a number of testable hypotheses. 
 
















- board power 
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Executive risk bearing 
Although some researchers argue that the implementation and use of compensation schemes 
can potentially mitigate the mis-alignment of managerial incentives and associated agency 
problems, these schemes are not without their critics.  Linking a manager’s remuneration too 
closely to firm performance could potentially lead to risk-avoiding behavior by the manager 
(Fama, 1980; Holmstrom, 1979).  Whilst it can be argued that equity and performance based 
compensation can have desirable motivational aspects, it may also cause the manager to have 
undesirable risk bearing characteristics.  Rappaport (1981; 1999) argues that managers, who 
act as the agents of the shareholders, are more risk averse than the owners of the company.  
Unlike owners of the company, who are able to diversify their ownership portfolio, managers 
have already invested their non-diversifiable human capital in the firm (Balkin & Gomez-
Mejia, 1990; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992).  Whilst it might be undesirable to have mangers 
attached to high levels of risk, (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1988) noted that in high growth 
US companies, risk taking is rewarded (although there is often a question of low job security) 
whilst the more established firm seldom encourages risk taking by its managers.  Indeed the 
IPO setting is one where there is a large amount of change and risk taking as the company 
exposes itself to the public investment for the first time (Certo, Daily, Cannella & Dalton, 
2003). 
 
In terms of compensation issues the most significant part of risk bearing for the executive is 
the acceptance of equity-based compensation within their compensation contract.  Any form 
of equity-based pay will cause the executive to bear risk that could otherwise be more 
efficiently borne by the shareholders who are able to diversify their investments.  As a 
consequence of this, executives are more likely to attach higher values to the levels of cash 
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payment made than to that of any share options (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  If company risk is 
high, then any proportion of remuneration that is equity based will be further loaded not only 
with non-diversifiable risk but also company risk.  As such the executives will face a very 
different level of risk to the shareholder, and these risks can hinder the alignment of the two 
in the context of pay schemes that link pay to performance (Gray & Cannella, 1997).  If firm 
performance is poor, then the executives not only risk losing potential earnings, but also their 
job and reputation as ‘good’ board members (Cannella, Frasier & Lee, 1995; Coughlan & 
Schmidt, 1985; Gilson, 1989).  Given this double-edged sword, the risk-adverse executive is 
more likely to resist the presence of such forms of remuneration, particularly at the time of 
IPO. This leads us to hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the risk of the company, the less likely it will implement equity 
based incentive pay schemes at the time of the IPO. 
 
 
Ownership structure and equity based incentive schemes 
Organizational theorists have increasing drawn on agency theory in order to focus on  
problems associated with separation of ownership and control (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; 
Brennan & Franks, 1997; Certo et al., 2001).  Even though there is a direct dilution of 
ownership at the time of the listing executive directors and other board members retain a 
proportion of ownership at IPO.  In particular, where the founder of the company is still 
present as an active board member any dilution of ownership might not be the driving factor 
for remuneration schemes.  Indeed in recent finding by (Baker & Gompers, 2003), dilution of 
ownership was not the significant factor in determining the firm’s corporate governance 
characteristics, and in particular equity based incentive schemes.  Any retained ownership by 
the founder means that there could be a reduced need for incentives to realign the principal 
and agent due to the “Jensen-Meckling (1976) effect” associated with minimal divorce of 
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ownership and control.  This, combined with the ownership of other board members, creates 
a unique environment for corporate governance issues and in particular the provision/use of 
equity based incentive schemes. 
 
More recent agency research is focused on organizational outcomes related to the presence of 
multiple governance mechanisms that may work in concert (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). 
A number of studies suggest that one governance channel may complement and/or substitute 
for another (Filatotchev, 2006; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Grossman, 2002). Rediker and Seth 
(1995), for example, in their analysis of US bank holding companies provide evidence of the 
substitution of board monitoring by monitoring by outside large shareholders. This section 
extends Rediker and Seth’s analysis by focusing on governance aspects of young, fast-growing 
firms and considers how performance-related executive compensation can 
substitute/complement governance effects of various constituencies of shareholders in the IPO 
firm. 
 
A growing number of studies in entrepreneurship and upper echelon research indicate that the 
ability of the young firm’s founders to formulate and implement strategic initiatives which 
capitalize on environmental opportunities is vital to organizational growth and survival 
(Finkle, 1998; Jayraman, Khorana & Nelling, 2000; Steier & Greenwood, 2000).  Founder 
characteristics, therefore, such as motivation and incentives, have a direct impact on the 
firm’s development and success in the long-run (Daily & Dalton, 1997). However, the IPO 
process is accompanied by significant shifts in the distribution of ownership and control 
between founding and new shareholders that create misalignment of incentives and a related 
set of agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mello & Parsons, 1998). As Pagano and Röell 
(1998: 188) have pointed out, “in this situation the main conflict of interest is that between 
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the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders, rather than between hired 
managers and the generality of shareholders”. A reduction in founders’ share ownership 
subsequent to flotation may reduce their incentives to learn and apply their knowledge to the 
benefit of the newly-created public firm and its external shareholders (Sapienza & Gupta, 
1994; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003). Therefore, founders’ equity-related incentives may 
be another factor contributing to the level of risk of a new venture. It may be reduced by the 
introduction of performance related equity incentives, and we suggest: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the level of retained ownership by the founding directors’, the less 
likely it will be that conditional equity based incentive schemes are present in the 
remuneration contracts of executive directors (substitution effect). 
 
Agency theory looks to the use of share option schemes to promote ‘ownership’ behavior 
from the executives. In the entrepreneurial IPO there is often a significant amount of retained 
ownership by executive directors following the flotation.  Agency theorists argue for the 
development of governance systems to monitor the behavior of the agent, and the 
establishment of equity based incentive schemes can be considered as such a system.  
Generally, shareholders are not adequately able to rely on information as to the effectiveness 
of the agent.  Equity based incentive schemes specifically take steps to realign the interest of 
the agent with those held by the principals by enabling the agents to become owners in the 
company (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  This is one of the rational for incentive 
schemes to be implemented and tied to performance outcomes (traditionally these are tied to 
‘objective’ measures linked to company performance such as earnings per share, total 
shareholder return and market share prices) (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Hence, we suggest:  
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Hypothesis 3: The greater the level of retained ownership by the non-founding  executive 
directors , the less likely it will be that conditional equity based incentive schemes are 
present in the remuneration contracts of executive directors (substitution effect). 
 
In the UK, external monitoring by independent (non-executive) board members is strongly 
recommended within the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2006).  More 
specifically,  all listed companies should have at least one third of the board comprising of 
such non-executive directors (Hampel, 1998b).  Indeed the implementation of the Combined 
Code means companies must comply with the new two tiered provision, increasing the ratio 
of non-executive directors for FTSE 350 companies to at least half the board (excluding the 
chairman) and for other companies at least two independent non-executive directors.   
 
Although non-executive directors may provide a particularly important strategic contribution 
by monitoring managerial decisions, as well as having a direct involvement in formulating the 
firm’s mission and developing of its strategy; research literature on corporate boards has 
suggested that board vigilance is often low, with non-executives’ involvement in managerial 
oversight being passive, and that it relies mainly on the financial outcomes of strategic 
decisions of the CEO (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Golden & Zajac, 2001). Agency research 
suggests that non-executive directors may perform their monitoring function more proactively 
when their interests are aligned with those of shareholders, and a number of studies have linked 
their close involvement in managerial oversight with their personal financial risk, approximated 
by ownership interests in the firm (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). This 
research, however, is mainly focused on large, mature organizations, and the IPO context 
provides new dimensions to the importance of board members’ incentives (Filatotchev, 2006).  
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In the uncertain, “high-velocity” environment of an IPO, the board of directors needs to be 
more pro-active in terms of its involvement in strategy development and implementation, in 
addition to its monitoring and oversight roles (Carpenter, Pollock & Leary, 2003).  Extending 
agency arguments related to the incentive alignment effects of directors’ equity, some 
researchers suggest that non-executive directors will perform their advisory and resource roles 
better when they have a significant financial stake in the company. Hambrick and Jackson 
(2000), for example, indicate that non-executive share ownership not only creates financial 
incentives for non-executives but also increases their identification with the company, making 
them more willing to use their knowledge and more generous in their time and attention.  
    
In their study of Internet IPOs in the USA, Sanders and Boivie (2004) argue that non-
executives’ equity may be a proxy for firm quality when direct financial valuations are difficult, 
because of the high level of risk and relatively short performance history of the firm. Using this 
signaling framework they suggest that equity incentives attract high-caliber directors who are 
able to mitigate both adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the IPO firm. These 
arguments imply that:   
 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the level of retained ownership by the non- executive directors, the 
more likely it will be that conditional equity based incentive schemes are present in the 
remuneration contracts of executive directors (complementarity effect). 
 
In addition to the non-executive providing a monitoring role in order to promote shareholder 
value, increasingly the role of the block-holder will provide additional external monitoring 
for shareholders.  Indeed the strength and power of block-holders within companies should 
not be underestimated (Gillian & Starks, 2000).  David, Kochhar and Levitas (1998) found 
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that the nature of ownership in U.S. firms was an important determinant of CEO 
compensation. In particular their research supported the case that institutional investors (with 
only an ‘investment relationship’) showed preferences towards lower overall levels of cash 
compensation with an increase in the proportion of compensation received from long-term 
incentives. 
 
Particularly at the point of IPO, many companies in the UK are able to choose either a 
‘placing’ (where shares are usually offered to a selected base of institutional investors) or a 
‘public offer’ (sponsors offer shares to private and/or institutional investors with the shares 
often being underwritten by some of the institutional investors) as their method of flotation 
(London Stock Exchange, 2002). Hence block-holders are particularly prevalent in IPO 
companies, and previous research indicates that they have an ability and incentives to focus 
managers’ attention on shareholder value (Filatotchev et al., 2006).  These particular types of 
investors will want to see evidence of governance systems that promote shareholder return.  
If this is indeed the case, then in order to attract such investors at this critical time of raising 
capital, equity based incentive schemes may play a valuable signalling role of the IPO team 
and its advisors taking shareholder value seriously.  Any company with such a scheme in 
place that ties the executives’ compensation to performance that promotes shareholder value 
will be seen in favorable light by block-holders. Thus:   
 
Hypothesis 5:  The presence of an external block-holder will mean it is more likely that that 
conditional equity based incentive schemes are present in the remuneration contracts of 
executive directors (complementarity effect). 
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Board characteristics and equity based incentive schemes 
From the agency perspective, in order to prevent managerial errors and compensate for 
relative lack of experience, the board should be involved in the critical functions of active 
monitoring and evaluation of decisions made by the CEO and other top management team 
members (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The effectiveness of these monitoring and control functions 
has usually been related to the extent of board independence and has often been approximated 
by structural factors such as the proportion of outsiders on the board, CEO/Chairman roles 
held jointly or separately, etc. (Daily, Johnson & Dalton, 1999; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  
 
More recent resource and socio-cognitive views on corporate boards have extended agency 
research by suggesting that pro-active behavior by non-executive directors depends not only 
on the extent of board independence, but also on the strategic perspective and base of 
experience provided by their appointments to other organizations (Carpenter, 2002; Carpenter 
& Westphal 2001). The resource based view emphasizes that, in addition to control functions, 
the board may also play service and strategic roles in the decision-making process (Daily et 
al., 1999; Pfeffer, 1972; Westphal, 1999), especially at those points in the life-cycle of the 
firm that involve strategic transition (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).  Previous research 
considers IPO as one such crucial transition phase (Carpenter et al., 2003; Daily & Dalton, 
1992). In particular, the links that non-executive directors have with the firm’s environment 
can be used to obtain important information and strategic expertise  (Golden & Zajac, 2001).  
Pye (2001:42) suggests that in order to “add value” to the board, non-executive directors are 
expected to bring a background of executive experience of running other firms. Therefore, we 
may expect that independent directors will appreciate the importance of conditional equity-
based compensation schemes, and we suggest: 
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Hypothesis 6: The greater the level of board independence, the more likely it will be that 
conditional equity based incentive schemes are present in the remuneration contracts of 
executive directors (complementarity effect). 
 
Research on behavior and power in organizations has suggested that board structural 
independence and incentives to intervene may be negatively affected by executives’ 
entrenchment, which is directly related to the executives’ power within the organization 
(Golden & Zajac, 2001; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; Westphal, 
1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) in their study of board 
dynamics in the UK firms argue that the power and influence of senior position holders may 
affect both board selection and board decision-making processes. 
  
These arguments may be particularly strong in the context of IPOs where executive directors 
are usually the dominant group of shareholders upon flotation.  In addition, executive 
directors are very often the original founders of the IPO firm, and entrepreneurship research 
suggests that founder status of the CEO and other members of executive team may be another 
dimension of executive power within the organization that leads to a negative attitude to 
external interference with “their” business (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Ensley, Pearson & 
Amason, 2002).  
 
These arguments suggest that the “toughness” of executive compensation schemes depends 
on the extent of founders’ control of the IPO board. Because of the share ownership dilution 
during the IPO, founder-directors may be tempted to introduce non-performance related pay 
schemes, since in this case they can increase their equity stakes even when the firm 
underperforms. In other words, this provides them with an opportunity to appropriate 
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potential upside gains free of risk, while the risk of downside being shifted to external 
shareholders. This scenario becomes more plausible when the IPO firm has a founding CEO, 
or when founders control the board. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 7a: The greater the proportion of founder-directors on board, the less likely it 
will be that conditional equity based incentive schemes are present in the remuneration 
contracts of executive directors. 
Hypothesis 7b: The probability of conditional equity based incentive schemes being present 
in the remuneration contracts of executive directors is negatively associated with presence of 
founder-CEO. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The sample 
The data sample used in this analysis comprises of a unique data set of founder-led initial 
public offering companies in the UK.  The data for the study have both been sourced from the 
London Stock Exchange New Issues Listing and information from the Market Information 
and Analysis section that hold historical fact sheets for all issues from 1998 (including 
companies issuing additional shares, re-admissions and transfers between markets).  Lists 
have been merged and cross-referenced to enable a complete list of all issues and a list of IPO 
companies to be obtained.  The data sample has been collected from those companies floated 
on the London Stock Exchange (Main market and the TechMark) and the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) over a five year period from 1 January 1998 and 31st December 
2002.   
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For the given period, the London Stock Exchange lists show us that 872 companies were 
floated as initial public offerings.  Any company with non UK incorporation was excluded as 
this might be seen as leading to different governance structures.  The IPO prospectuses for all 
remaining 766 UK companies were obtained from Thomson Research, which provides a 
comprehensive coverage of company filings for publicly quoted UK companies.  Missing 
prospectuses were obtained either via company web sites, or by telephone/written request to 
the companies or their advisors whichever was deemed more appropriate.  Any company 
deciding upon UK flotation must produce and file with the Stock Exchange a prospectus.  
This provides a wealth of information including details of the company’s financial history, 
background details to the board of directors and their compensation contract, share ownership 
and details of any equity based incentive schemes. Each prospectus was examined and 
particular emphasis given to the section detailing the history and founders of the company.  
Any companies that were unit or investment trust were excluded from the sample first (these 
have particular governance characteristics), then those deemed to involve a de-merger, 
merger or acquisition, corporate spin off, equity carve outs, reorganizations, or could be 
considered as solely acquisition vehicles were also excluded (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002).  
This resulted in 311 companies who clearly demonstrated that they had been developed via 
the entrepreneurial process with entrepreneurial founders and those founders were serving as 




The dependent variables in both instances are dichotomous and are measured by the 
implementation of equity based incentive schemes at the point of IPO and the presence of any 
conditional equity based remuneration scheme (i.e. with specific performance criteria to be 
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achieved in order for grants to vest) at the point of IPO.  This information has been primarily 
taken from the IPO prospectus that gives details of such schemes to future investors.  In order 
to ensure accuracy, where details in the prospectus were vague, to prevent the possibility of 
missing data or a wrong assumption, annual report and accounts following the IPO were 
checked with reference to the scheme date in the IPO prospectus.  This ensured completeness, 
especially in light of the implementation of the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 
(2002). 
  
Independent variables  
Company Risk 
Since the ex ante IPO’s risk is unobservable and multi-dimensional factor, we use a number 
of proxies to operationalize it. In line with previous research on IPO companies, the fist 
measurement for risk has been taken from the ‘risk factors’ discussed in the prospectus.  
These have simply been counted to provide a continuous measure for the risk of the firm.  In 
line with previous research, these can be seen as an adequate proxy for the risks surrounding 
the firm (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Certo et al., 2001; Cyr, Johnson & Welbourne, 2000). 
 
A second measure for risk was created against the strength of the present executive team, 
with particular reference to the founder executives.  A dichotomous variable was created to 
indicate whether the loss of founder/key personnel within the executive team was mentioned 
within the risk factors (1 = yes; 0 = no).  If so this will be a particular risk to the further 
performance and direction of the company.   
 
The third risk proxy measure is derived from the profitability (or un-profitability) of the firm 
as disclosed to the future investors in the IPO prospectus.  Unfortunately due to the age of the 
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many of the firms a trend variable proved to be impractical.  So, in line with previous 
research, a dichotomous measure was created (1= profitable, 0 = unprofitable) (Beatty & 
Zajac, 1994).    
 
The fourth measure for risk was created, again against the (un)profitability of the firm.  This 
was an expansion of the dichotomous measure above in that the variable was made ordinal 
over the four year period prior to the IPO.  No trading, or a loss disclosed in any one year 
prior to the IPO was given the value of 1.  Summing the values for each year gave a rank of 0 
to 4.  Hence over the four year period, companies with zero were determined as very low risk, 
as compared with companies with a four, i.e. four years of either no trading or losses, which 
were assessed as very high risk.   
 
Ownership Measures 
Ownership of the company is very clearly stated in the prospectus in the section detailing 
“Directors’ Interests” within the ‘Additional Information’ in the prospectus.  As a rule, the 
ownership in this section is broken down into both the number of shares held by each director 
on the board and the percentage of the total equity held by each individual member.  Details 
both prior to and at the point of the IPO are given together in this one section.  Additional 
information as to whether the shares are beneficial or non-beneficial and voting rights are 
also stipulated giving sufficient information for exact ownership details to be calculated.  
Later on in the same section of the document, block-holders (having greater than 3% share 
ownership) are also cited. For this research, ownership details were carefully collated for 
each individual director and the position on the board was noted (4 categories, CEO, Chair, 
Executive director, non-executive director).  A dichotomous variable was also created to state 
weather the board member was a founder of the company or not.  By combining this 
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information, ownership variables for the executive and non-executive founder-directors and 
other executive and other non-executives were created.   
 
Two variables were used to operationalize the presence of block-holders in the IPO. First, a 
continuous variable measuring the cumulative ownership stake of 3% blockholders (apart 
from the company directors) was used. We also used a dichotomous variable that was equal 
one if the IPO had more than one blockholder, and zero otherwise.   
 
Board Characteristics 
 Building on previous research, a continuous variable measuring the ratio of non-executive 
directors to the total number of board members was used to operationalize the extent of board 
structural independence (see Filatotchev, 2006, for an extensive discussion). The extent of 
founders’ control over board was operationalized by a continuous variable measuring the 
proportion of board seats held by founders. In addition, a dummy variable “CEO/Founder” 
was assigned a value of one if the CEO was a founder of the firms, and zero otherwise. 
 
Control Variables 
Several control variables were used.  The sample of 311 entrepreneurial IPO companies 
bridges a five year period that covers a bullish peak in the market mid way and then a slower 
bear market.  As a result of this market fluctuation, four year dummies were created.  This 
gave the ability to control for variations due to the nature of the market in the year of the 
IPO.  Similarly, industry differences between sample firms needed to be controlled for.  
Three digit SIC codes proved to give too much diversification within the sample so the 
dummy variables created were based on a combination of the London Stock Exchange’s 
transfer to two digit SIC codes and a further amalgamation to more general sectors 
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(resources, consumer goods, services, financial and information technology).  The age of the 
firm has been used to control for the sophistication of the firm as its organizational structure 
and the development of governance strategies may be linked to a life-cycle development 
effect.  Similarly, if a company had an incentive pay scheme prior to the IPO, it would be 
logical to continue this scheme or replace it with a new one at the point of IPO.  This path-
dependency in executive remuneration was controlled for in the model by using a 
dichotomous variable to indicate the presence of any incentive schemes rewarding executives 
with equity prior to the point of the flotation.   
 
Previous research within mature companies shows that size might also be seen as a 
determinant of the executive compensation contract (Conyon, Peck & Sadler, 2000; Gregg et 
al., 1993).  In order to control for the size of the IPO company, two variables were 
considered: the market capital value of the firm at the point of the IPO and turnover in the 
year prior to the IPO.  Using market capital value at the time of the IPO to control for size 
has specific problems.  The value placed on the share price might be influenced by the 
adoption of governance factors, including the provision of equity based incentive schemes 
(Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Certo, 2003; Certo et al., 2003).  Indeed market capitalization may be 
under-valued as information asymmetries between the various teams involved in the IPO 
process can lead to underpricing (when the initial offer price is less than the first day close of 
trade price) (Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Michaely & Shaw, 1994).  
Alternatively, governance signals (including retained ownership levels) may have a positive 
effect on the value of the firm (McBain & Krause, 1989; Mikkelson et al., 1997).  With these 
factors in mind, the measure of market capitalization as a control for the size of the 
organization might have considerable endogenous and exogenous influences.  For this 




Ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis makes the assumption that any linear model 
is continuous, homoskedastic and normally distributed.  Thus with the dependent variable 
being the presence of conditional equity incentive schemes within the compensation contract 
of the executives, the use of OLS regression to model this data is inappropriate.  When the 
dependent variable is of a dichotomous nature a more appropriate tool is multiple 
discriminant analysis or a logistic regression model (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998).  
In most applications of this nature the logit and probit models are quite similar, with the main 
difference being that “the logistic distribution has slightly flatter tails” (Gujarati, 2003).     
 
For the implementation of schemes, the logit regressions were run on the total sample of 311 
companies. In order to truly have a dichotomous variable for the presence of conditional 
incentive schemes, a sub sample on 295 companies was selected as being all those who 
presented and an equity base incentive scheme at IPO.  For comparison, both logit and probit 
models have been run on the variables.  The results for both models were similar, with only 
marginal differences in the levels of significances.  With such similar results, only those of 
the one (logit) model have been reported.    
 
EMPERICAL RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 provide the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for all variables used 
in the study. Of the 311 companies comprising our sample, 126 companies (41%) already had 
incentive schemes operating within the company prior to the IPO.  Of the companies without 
schemes (185), 173 companies  took the opportunity to implement an equity based incentive 
scheme, either an executive share option scheme or long-term incentive plan.  At the time of 
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IPO, a total of 295 companies (94.9%) of the sample had some type of equity based incentive 
scheme operating.  From the sub sample of 295 companies, 49.2% of these schemes had 
some form of performance criteria attached to make vesting conditional to meeting (or 
exceeding) these targets.  Such a high number of companies operating schemes at the IPO 
show the importance attached to these, both internally and externally. 
Table 1: Means, Median and Standard Deviations 
Variable Mean Median 
or % a S.D. 
Dependent Variables    
1 At IPO: implementation of equity 
based incentive scheme  
 55.80  
2 At IPO presence of any conditional 
scheme   50.20  
Risk    
3 Number of risk factors in prospectus 11.87 10.00 7.28 
4 Departure of Key Personnel as risk 
factor 
 70.80  
5 Risk proxy based on (un) 
profitability 
 61.00  
6 Risk proxy indicator relating to 
previous reported profit/loss 
2.63 4.00 1.58 
Ownership at IPO    
7 Exec founders’ ownership (%) 28.02 23.71 21.68 
8 NED founders’ ownership (%) 3.02 0.00 10.43 
9 Non founder execs’ ownership (%) 4.32 1.17 7.10 
10 Non founder NEDs’ ownership (%) 3.64 0.52 8.14 
11 Total board ownership (%) 39.02 38.13 22.22 
12 Presence of block-holder  82.14  
13 Total equity block-holders (%) 22.75 19.56 20.19 
Board Variables    
14 CEO founder present  60.00  
15 Proportion of founders on the board 29.11 25.00 14.37 
16 Proportion of NED’s on the board 41.86 40.00 14.50 
Control Variables    
17 Annual Turnover (£,000) 21429 2612 88966 
18 Founding Age 6.33 4.00 6.39 
19 Pre IPO: Presence of incentive 
scheme  40.50  
a Percentages are reported for the 0/1 variables. 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix for all variables 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 At IPO: implementation of equity based 
incentive scheme          
2 At IPO presence of any conditional scheme .017         
3 Number of risk factors in prospectus -.218  .039        
4 Departure of Key Personnel as risk factor -.099 -.147  .175        
5 Risk proxy based on (un) profitability -.040 -.122  .073 .181       
6 Risk proxy indicator relating to previous 
reported profit/loss -.047 -.165  .072 .226  .779      
7 Exec founders’ ownership (%) .204  -.010 -.146  -.036 -.182  -.269     
8 NED founders’ ownership (%) -.054 -.096 .136  -.123  -.089 -.030 -.252    
9 Non founder execs’ ownership (%) .035 .068 -.150  -.041 -.062 -.113  -.063 -.040  
10 Non founder NEDs’ ownership (%) .067 -.073 .026 .044 .105 .116  -.142  -.063 -.025 
11 Total board ownership (%) .210  -.060 -.111 -.092 -.201 -.270  .786  .188  .231  
12 Presence of block-holder -.150  .041 -.011 .224  .175  .236  -.342  -.109 -.036 
13 Total equity block-holders (%) -.150  .003 .113 .175  .122  .155  -.479  -.134  -.157  
14 CEO founder present .202  -.136  -.256  -.038 .016 -.019 .246  -.199  -.139  
15 Proportion of founders on the board .166  -.106 -.161  -.052 -.028 .033 .242  .073 -.289  
16 Proportion of NED’s on the board -.118  -.003 .270  .003 .039 .064 -.312  .182  -.241  
17 Annual Turnover (£,000) -.145  .096 .236  .020 -.218  -.209  -.043 .046 .085 
18 Age of Company -.138  .166  .048 -.116  -.441  -.495  .065 -.035 .091 
19 Incentive scheme pre IPO -.910  .066 .259  .087 .008 -.012 -.228  .075 -.027 
Values > .155 are significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 




Table 2 Continued: Correlation matrix for all variables  
 Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 At IPO: implementation of equity based 
incentive scheme          
2 At IPO presence of any conditional scheme          
3 Number of risk factors in prospectus          
4 Departure of Key Personnel as risk factor          
5 Risk proxy based on (un) profitability          
6 Risk proxy indicator relating to previous 
reported profit/loss          
7 Exec founders’ ownership (%)          
8 NED founders’ ownership (%)          
9 Non founder execs’ ownership (%)          
10 Non founder NEDs’ ownership (%)          
11 Total board ownership (%) .190          
12 Presence of block-holder .024 -.393         
13 Total equity block-holders (%) -.094 -.626  .502        
14 CEO founder present .004 .103 -.022 -.168       
15 Proportion of founders on the board -.042 .168  -.067 -.129  .251      
16 Proportion of NED’s on the board .179  -.232  .100 .134  -.027 -.227     
17 Annual Turnover (£,000) -.081 -.021 -.083 .022 -.185  -.187  .002   
18 Age of Company -.145 .023 -.070 .011 -.176  -.224  -.005 .401   
19 Incentive scheme pre IPO -.073 -.224  .149  .159  -.224  -.231  .125 .154 .187  
Values > .155 are significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 
Values > .120 are significant at the 5% level (2-tailed)   N= 311 
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Table 1 also shows that founders occupied approximately 30 percent of board seats in the 
companies we studied. A founder was the firm’s CEO in 60 percent of cases, indicating that 
founders had retained strong leadership positions even at the IPO stage. The founders-
directors were by far the predominant group of insider shareholders, retaining above 32 
percent of voting shares after the IPO on average. In terms of board structure, independent 
directors held 42 percent of board seats on average, with an average non-executive share 
ownership being 3.6 percent. Above 80 percent of our sample had blockholders, with the 
cumulative ownership stake of blockholders amounting to 22.8 percent, the second largest 
stake after founders’ share ownership. 
 
The results of formal tests of hypotheses are provided in Tables 3, 4 and 5.  




























Constant 1.481 1.458 †  1.882 * 2.857 ** 4.779 *** 
Number of risk factors  -.053 ** -.046 * -.040 †  -.026 




-1.249 ** -1.373 ** 
(Un)profitability      -.902 * 1.257 †  
Previous 
trading/(un)profitability 
    -1.035 ***  
Controls      
Log Turnover yr-1 (£,000) -.351 †  -.251 -.180 -.362 †  -.581 ** 
Age of Company .009 .003 .001 -.010 -.046  
% correct predictions 60.6   63.9 58.9     61.4     72.9 
Nagelkerke R2 .062 .110 .159     .191     .304 
Model Χ 2 value 11.8  17.9 †  26.3 **     32.0 **   53.6 *** 
† p≤0.10;  * p≤0.05;  ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001     N=208 
a
 The logistic regression also includes unreported dummy variables to control for the year of 




Each set of regressions includes the regression with controls only, and this help to verify 
whether the main regressors contributed to the explanatory power of the models used.  The 
results in Table 3 provide support for hypothesis 1.   Four risk measures show that firms 
considered more risky are significantly less likely to implement any form of equity based 
incentive scheme at the time of IPO.  The significance of the risk variables suggests that 
firms, whose executives face personal employment risk related to the potential for company 
survival, are not subjected to further risk bearing via their compensation contract. 
 
Table 4: Logistic regression results for retained ownership models b 





















Constant -1.269 † -.962 -2.900 *** -2.155 * -2.445 * 
Exec founders’ ownership (%)  -.015 *   -.012 † 
NED founders’ ownership (%)  -.053 **   -.042 * 
Non founder execs’ ownership 
(%)  .005 
  .002  
Non founder NEDs’ 
ownership (%)  -.020 
  -.016 
Presence of block-holder   1.078 **  .742 † 
Total equity block-holders (%)    .012 †  
Controls      
Log Turnover yr-1 (£,000) .371 * .484 ** .554 ** .499 ** .647 *** 
Age of Company .044 † .036 .041 .040 † .033 
Incentive scheme pre IPO .112 -.054 -.261 -.239 -.371 
% correct predictions 65.0 67.5 67.3 66.5 67.6 
Nagelkerke R2 .136 .195 .193 .168 .231 
Model Χ 2 value 25.9 ** 36.9 *** 34.0 *** 29.0 ** 40.5 *** 
† p≤0.10;  * p≤0.05;  ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001   N=240 
b
 The logistic regression also includes unreported dummy variables to control for the year of the IPO 





The second set of results in Table 4 relates to the effects of the ownership structure at the 
point of the IPO.  This shows that firms with stronger alignment between the interests of 
founders and shareholders are less likely to impose performance conditions on any equity 
based schemes in place, in line with Hypothesis 2.  The level of retained ownership by the 
founders (mean ownership of 31.05%) shows that the founders on the board of directors still 
effectively control the firms.  At the time of the IPO they embrace the opportunity to gain 
capital and transfer risk to outside investors.  Although the non-founding executive and 
independent directors hold on average 4.3 and 3.6 percent ownership in the companies, there 
is no significant association between conditional schemes and these levels of ownership. 
Therefore, our hypotheses 3 and 4 are not supported. 
 
Hypothesis 5, on the other hand, is supported for both operationalizations of blockowners, 
with the presence of external block-holders enhancing the governance and indeed being 
positively associated with any incentive pay schemes having specific performance targets 
attached.   
 
Table 5 provides the logistic regression results for the effects of board characteristics. There 
is no significant association between the introduction of conditional schemes and the board 
independence variable. Therefore, our hypothesis 6 is not supported. However, both 
CEO/Founder dummy and the proportion of founders on board are significantly and 






Table 5: Logistic regression results for governance models c 

























Constant -1.269 †  -.995 -.551 -.441 -1.354 †  -1.077 
CEO founder present  -.453 †   -.326   -.453 † 
Proportion of founders on the 
board 
  -.022 * -.019 †    
Proportion of NED’s on the 
board 
    .002 .002 
Controls       
Log Turnover yr-1 (£,000) .371 * .359 * .393 * .382 * .370 †  .358 ** 
Age of Company .044 * .041 †  .035 .034 .044 .041 † 
Incentive scheme pre IPO .112 .020 -.012 -.066 .102 .009 
% correct predictions 65.0 61.3 65.0 65.8 64.6 63.3 
Nagelkerke R2 .136 .148 .159 .164 .137 .149 
Model Χ 2 value 25.9 ** 28.3 ** 30.4 ** 31.5 ** 25.9 ** 28.3 ** 
† p≤0.10;  * p≤0.05;  ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001     N=240 
c




Finally, in terms of control variables, older and larger firms are more likely to have 
conditional executive compensation schemes. We did not identify any consistent effects of 
the sector and year dummies on the dependent variable. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Using the sample of 311 entrepreneurial IPO firms has enabled a unique study of the impact 
that ownership structure within the company can have on the governance of the company and 
in particular the use of equity based incentive schemes to tie executives to performance and 
increasing shareholder return.  The findings suggest that the founders of newly listed 
companies are still very much in control and resist executive equity rewards being tied 
directly to objective performance measures.  In line with Jensen and Meckling (1976) who 
suggest that minimal dilution of ownership should create a principal-agent problem, our study 
 31 
indicates that the retention of ownership ensures that the founders’ interests are aligned with 
interests of other shareholders. 
  
Our analysis also suggests that the founders are still able to exercise strong leadership 
including the influence of governance strategies.  Tied with the power of the Chief Executive 
(many of whom are founders), firms are maintaining a ‘founder-centric’ structure and have 
influence to negotiate governance structures that are positively preserving their influence and 
rewarding their length of service rather than performance by the nature of incentive grants 
being unconditional.   
 
On the other hand, we did not find evidence of the “good governance” roles of non-executive 
directors. The very fact that some founders of the firm also retain their influence by becoming 
non-executive directors, rather than exiting, also brings into question the objectivity of this 
role.  Our empirical results suggest that the non-executives are happy to leave objective 
performance targets out of the incentive schemes.  Bearing in mind that non-executive 
directors in our sample have a substantial equity stake in the firm, this brings into question 
the selection processes for the non-executive directors, as well as the extent of their 
independence from the founding directors in the context of IPOs.   
 
However, it is not totally a founder ‘self governing’ picture that emerges from our analysis.  
The IPO process by its very nature allows the institutional investor to purchase shares.  In our 
study it is the block-holder who appears to be at the forefront of the monitoring process.  It is 
no surprise to see a positive association between block-holders and the presence of 
conditional equity based incentive schemes.  Indeed this is one area that has been at the top of 
the agenda of institutional investor communities such as the Association of British Insurers, 
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and they have positively contributed to many guidelines promoting objective performance 
criteria for executives’ rewards  (Association of British Insurers, 2002). 
 
Previous research has recognized that governance mechanisms operate interdependently with 
the overall effectiveness depending on a simultaneous operation of several mechanisms in 
limiting managerial opportunism (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Walsh & Steward, 1990). Different 
governance mechanisms can substitute or complement each other, (Dalton, Daily, Certo & 
Roengpitya, 2003; Hoskisson et al., 2002), and the cost-benefit trade-offs among a variety of 
governance mechanisms would determine their use (Rediker & Seth, 1995: 88). We extend 
this research further and make two contributions. First, we suggest that 
substitution/complementarity hypothesis (e.g., Dalton et al., 2003) has relevance not only 
within the context of mature firms with diffused share ownership, but it plays a very 
important role in terms of mitigating conflicts between founders and shareholders in the IPO 
firm. Second, we analyze links between “toughness” of executive compensation and general 
governance factors in “threshold” firms, and this area was largely overlooked by agency 
research.  
 
With clear changes to the pay strategies happening at the point of IPO, there is the potential 
for further research in this area.  The commanding position of the founders’ leads to 
unconditional incentive rewards. However, research shows that founders do depart companies 
(either willingly or unwillingly).  Once this happens governance strategies again might be 
changed.  There is also the point that the majority of the schemes implemented follow a 
three-year cycle from granting to vesting.  One cannot ignore the possibility that grants are 
unconditional as their implementation has been no more than an experimental’ view of this 
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type of incentive scheme.  Further research based on a longitudinal study could provide 
insight into the changes and development of such schemes.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The paper’s findings indicate that corporate governance is not an exogenous mechanism that 
solely provides checks and controls over the efficiency with which companies are run and 
whether managers make decisions in the interests of shareholders. More specifically, 
executive incentive schemes are closely related to the distribution of ownership and power 
among founding and independent board members; insiders and external blockholders. The 
next step would be to link different governance configurations with organizational outcomes, 
and previous research provides evidence of possible effects of the IPO governance 
characteristics on the level of internationalization (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2003) and 
performance (e.g., Certo et al., 2001). Although it is beyond the ambitions of this paper to 
specify and test empirically complex linkages between board dynamics, incentive schemes 
and IPO performance, it helps to map out future broad areas and questions for empirical 
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 Table 1: Means, Median and Standard Deviations 
Variable Mean Median 
or % a S.D. 
Dependent Variables    
1 At IPO: implementation of equity 
based incentive scheme  
 55.80  
2 At IPO presence of any conditional 
scheme   50.20  
Risk    
3 Number of risk factors in prospectus 11.87 10.00 7.28 
4 Departure of Key Personnel as risk 
factor 
 70.80  
5 Risk proxy based on (un) 
profitability 
 61.00  
6 Risk proxy indicator relating to 
previous reported profit/loss 
2.63 4.00 1.58 
Ownership at IPO    
7 Exec founders’ ownership (%) 28.02 23.71 21.68 
8 NED founders’ ownership (%) 3.02 0.00 10.43 
9 Non founder execs’ ownership (%) 4.32 1.17 7.10 
10 Non founder NEDs’ ownership (%) 3.64 0.52 8.14 
11 Total board ownership (%) 39.02 38.13 22.22 
12 Presence of block-holder  82.14  
13 Total equity block-holders (%) 22.75 19.56 20.19 
Board Variables    
14 CEO founder present  60.00  
15 Proportion of founders on the board 29.11 25.00 14.37 
16 Proportion of NED’s on the board 41.86 40.00 14.50 
Control Variables    
17 Annual Turnover (£,000) 21429 2612 88966 
18 Founding Age 6.33 4.00 6.39 
19 Pre IPO: Presence of incentive 
scheme  40.50  




Table 2: Correlation matrix for all variables 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 At IPO: implementation of equity based 
incentive scheme          
2 At IPO presence of any conditional scheme .017         
3 Number of risk factors in prospectus -.218  .039        
4 Departure of Key Personnel as risk factor -.099 -.147  .175        
5 Risk proxy based on (un) profitability -.040 -.122  .073 .181       
6 Risk proxy indicator relating to previous 
reported profit/loss -.047 -.165  .072 .226  .779      
7 Exec founders’ ownership (%) .204  -.010 -.146  -.036 -.182  -.269     
8 NED founders’ ownership (%) -.054 -.096 .136  -.123  -.089 -.030 -.252    
9 Non founder execs’ ownership (%) .035 .068 -.150  -.041 -.062 -.113  -.063 -.040  
10 Non founder NEDs’ ownership (%) .067 -.073 .026 .044 .105 .116  -.142  -.063 -.025 
11 Total board ownership (%) .210  -.060 -.111 -.092 -.201 -.270  .786  .188  .231  
12 Presence of block-holder -.150  .041 -.011 .224  .175  .236  -.342  -.109 -.036 
13 Total equity block-holders (%) -.150  .003 .113 .175  .122  .155  -.479  -.134  -.157  
14 CEO founder present .202  -.136  -.256  -.038 .016 -.019 .246  -.199  -.139  
15 Proportion of founders on the board .166  -.106 -.161  -.052 -.028 .033 .242  .073 -.289  
16 Proportion of NED’s on the board -.118  -.003 .270  .003 .039 .064 -.312  .182  -.241  
17 Annual Turnover (£,000) -.145  .096 .236  .020 -.218  -.209  -.043 .046 .085 
18 Age of Company -.138  .166  .048 -.116  -.441  -.495  .065 -.035 .091 
19 Incentive scheme pre IPO -.910  .066 .259  .087 .008 -.012 -.228  .075 -.027 
Values > .155 are significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 




Table 2 Continued: Correlation matrix for all variables  
 Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 At IPO: implementation of equity based 
incentive scheme          
2 At IPO presence of any conditional scheme          
3 Number of risk factors in prospectus          
4 Departure of Key Personnel as risk factor          
5 Risk proxy based on (un) profitability          
6 Risk proxy indicator relating to previous 
reported profit/loss          
7 Exec founders’ ownership (%)          
8 NED founders’ ownership (%)          
9 Non founder execs’ ownership (%)          
10 Non founder NEDs’ ownership (%)          
11 Total board ownership (%) .190          
12 Presence of block-holder .024 -.393         
13 Total equity block-holders (%) -.094 -.626  .502        
14 CEO founder present .004 .103 -.022 -.168       
15 Proportion of founders on the board -.042 .168  -.067 -.129  .251      
16 Proportion of NED’s on the board .179  -.232  .100 .134  -.027 -.227     
17 Annual Turnover (£,000) -.081 -.021 -.083 .022 -.185  -.187  .002   
18 Age of Company -.145 .023 -.070 .011 -.176  -.224  -.005 .401   
19 Incentive scheme pre IPO -.073 -.224  .149  .159  -.224  -.231  .125 .154 .187  
Values > .155 are significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 
Values > .120 are significant at the 5% level (2-tailed)   N= 311 




























Constant 1.481 1.458 †  1.882 * 2.857 ** 4.779 *** 
Number of risk factors  -.053 ** -.046 * -.040 †  -.026 




-1.249 ** -1.373 ** 
(Un)profitability      -.902 * 1.257 †  
Previous 
trading/(un)profitability 
    -1.035 ***  
Controls      
Log Turnover yr-1 (£,000) -.351 †  -.251 -.180 -.362 †  -.581 ** 
Age of Company .009 .003 .001 -.010 -.046  
% correct predictions 60.6   63.9 58.9     61.4     72.9 
Nagelkerke R2 .062 .110 .159     .191     .304 
Model Χ 2 value 11.8  17.9 †  26.3 **     32.0 **   53.6 *** 
† p≤0.10;  * p≤0.05;  ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001     N=208 
a
 The logistic regression also includes unreported dummy variables to control for the year of 
the IPO and industry effects. 
 
 
 Table 4: Logistic regression results for retained ownership models b 





















Constant -1.269 † -.962 -2.900 *** -2.155 * -2.445 * 
Exec founders’ ownership (%)  -.015 *   -.012 † 
NED founders’ ownership (%)  -.053 **   -.042 * 
Non founder execs’ ownership 
(%)  .005 
  .002  
Non founder NEDs’ 
ownership (%)  -.020 
  -.016 
Presence of block-holder   1.078 **  .742 † 
Total equity block-holders (%)    .012 †  
Controls      
Log Turnover yr-1 (£,000) .371 * .484 ** .554 ** .499 ** .647 *** 
Age of Company .044 † .036 .041 .040 † .033 
Incentive scheme pre IPO .112 -.054 -.261 -.239 -.371 
% correct predictions 65.0 67.5 67.3 66.5 67.6 
Nagelkerke R2 .136 .195 .193 .168 .231 
Model Χ 2 value 25.9 ** 36.9 *** 34.0 *** 29.0 ** 40.5 *** 
† p≤0.10;  * p≤0.05;  ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001   N=240 
b
 The logistic regression also includes unreported dummy variables to control for the year of the IPO 
and industry effects. 
 
 Table 5: Logistic regression results for governance models c 

























Constant -1.269 †  -.995 -.551 -.441 -1.354 †  -1.077 
CEO founder present  -.453 †   -.326   -.453 † 
Proportion of founders on the 
board 
  -.022 * -.019 †    
Proportion of NED’s on the 
board 
    .002 .002 
Controls       
Log Turnover yr-1 (£,000) .371 * .359 * .393 * .382 * .370 †  .358 ** 
Age of Company .044 * .041 †  .035 .034 .044 .041 † 
Incentive scheme pre IPO .112 .020 -.012 -.066 .102 .009 
% correct predictions 65.0 61.3 65.0 65.8 64.6 63.3 
Nagelkerke R2 .136 .148 .159 .164 .137 .149 
Model Χ 2 value 25.9 ** 28.3 ** 30.4 ** 31.5 ** 25.9 ** 28.3 ** 
† p≤0.10;  * p≤0.05;  ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001     N=240 
c
 The logistic regression also includes unreported dummy variables to control for the year of the IPO and 
industry effects. 
 
 
